Before These Memoirs - Part 13: The Jasim Alwan-Louai al-Atassi Aleppo Mutiny and Qudsi's Return to Power Under Duress

Sunday, 1 April

The army's leaders held their expanded conference at the Officers' Club in Homs, at five in the evening, chaired by General Wadih Maq'abari, commander of the air force, a competent officer with no political ties of his own.

But why did the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Zahreddine, not chair the meeting himself?

Perhaps he had his own personal reasons.

What matters is that the conference reached several decisions, the most important being the immediate exile of six officers of the 28 September coup, on pain of units marching on Damascus to remove them by force if need be. Among those to be exiled were Abdel Karim al-Nahlawi himself, Brigadier General Abdel Ghani Dahman, Colonel Muhaib al-Hindi,[1] and Major Hisham Abd Rabbo, the very officer I had met with on 28 March at the General Staff headquarters.

The other two important matters were as follows:

First, raising the question of Arab unity "with the liberated Arab states," on the understanding that it be a carefully studied union. It is clear that Egypt's name was not explicitly mentioned in this decision, though no other liberated Arab state existed besides it. Some of those present may have had Iraq in mind, ruled as it was by Abdel Karim Qasim, but no fair-minded person could accept union with an officer proven mentally unstable, one who had lost every nationalist ally by throwing himself into the arms of the Communists, and who had established the notorious al-Mahdawi Court, which executed and humiliated the finest officers of the Iraqi army. Circumstances, of course, changed later once his own regime was overthrown.

The second decision provided for forming a transitional government with no party members or military men among its ranks.

There was a further decision as well, calling for a general amnesty for "the military personnel who took part in the events of 31 March 1962, in every military region."

Monday, 2 April: The Aleppo Mutiny

The six officers were forced aboard a plane that carried them off, against their will, into the unknown.

With this act of exile, a black page of the country's history was closed.

One wonders what our brother al-Nuwaylati might say now, he who used to declare in my presence, as though the 28 September coup had been forged from his own late father's weapons, that he wished every "Nasserist" shot dead with a machine gun, and who had once been among the most trusted figures of the union era.

I think he has since begun shedding his own skin, donning the robes of "Nasserism" instead, now that the scales had begun tipping the other way.

How ugly you are, and how ugly your own faces, you hypocrites of every color, dancing at every wedding!

Yet the plane carrying the secessionists had scarcely lifted off when a fresh mutiny broke out among Aleppo's own forces, that very same day. It was led by two unionist officers, Colonel Jasim Alwan and Colonel Louai al-Atassi.

Jasim had been the commander of the 70th Brigade, which the secessionists had seized control of in his own absence in Damascus, mobilizing it to occupy sensitive positions on the night of the secession, and he had never ceased feeling the sting of this to his own reputation as a commander famed for his grip over his officers and his forces. But Colonel Abdel Karim al-Nahlawi had proven himself more skilled than Jasim at maneuvering and manipulating events.

As for Louai al-Atassi, he came from the noble Homsi family that had given the homeland Hashim al-Atassi and other distinguished statesmen.

There is no doubt that true Arab blood stirred in his veins, for he joined Jasim Alwan, and the two of them entrenched themselves in Aleppo, seized control of its forces, and began broadcasting communiqués under the name of "the Free Officers' Command." Their forces took over the radio station and the command headquarters. At the head of those who stormed the command building were the officers Mohammed Ibrahim al-Ali and Said Dabah together. Within a mere quarter of an hour, the attackers had taken control of the building, and four prominent military officials of the region were killed:

Major Safwat al-Hilali, head of the political bureau.

Major Nassouh al-Na'al, commander of the commando battalion.

Captain Kamel Arnous, head of the military intelligence branch.

Captain Jamil Qabbani, commander of the military police company.

The commander of the Northern Region, Brigadier General Hisham al-Maidani, was also arrested.[2]

Aleppo radio then attacked "the renegade faction, whose movement aimed at nothing but fragmenting the United Arab Republic, before leaping into power itself, sheltering behind the very errors of the government that its own hands had created, and casting the homeland's interest and the nation's safety aside without a second thought."

The "Northerners" made their own aims plain, declaring that they wished to purge the army of this destructive, renegade faction.

Above all, they said, they aimed at "working to realize the people's hope of restoring the union between the two halves of the United Arab Republic, on firm foundations and lasting, stable principles."

Jasim Alwan broadcast from the radio the news of "the return of the United Arab Republic." Damascus radio, for its part, kept broadcasting appeal after appeal to the people of Aleppo: O people of al-Shahba, O Hananu, O homeland of Sayf al-Dawla, O stronghold of Saadallah al-Jabiri, the homeland is in danger!

A terrifying gloom settled over the people of Damascus. Even our own grocer, Abu Sayyah, seemed to have lost his own wits, his eyes fixed and glassy as though frozen in his face, muttering to himself and gesturing nervously with his hands: What is this? What are they doing, what are we to do, where are we to go? There is no power and no strength except in God.

Alwan went to extremes, contacting the Egyptian ambassador and requesting support for his movement from Egyptian paratroopers and pilots.

But the other commands judged that Alwan and al-Atassi had gotten ahead of events, and Damascus radio began broadcasting telegram after telegram of support for the command, some of them containing outright threats to confront the "Northerners" by force of arms, so much so that one officer, Major Ali Hammad, commander of the border guard at Tadmur, "declared his support for the command, denounced the position of those throwing themselves into Abdel Nasser's arms, and announced his readiness to carry out orders."

The command then decided to send military forces to Aleppo, "to discipline the mutineers," setting out from Homs, and reinforced them with fighter aircraft. The planes did in fact bomb the radio station, and the broadcasters fled. The armored brigade entered the city of Aleppo without any real battles taking place. Jasim Alwan went into hiding, and Louai al-Atassi surrendered.

It appears the northern officers had received a promise of general amnesty, which is why they laid down their arms.

This promise was confirmed by the command, "which will look with a compassionate and merciful eye upon all the events that took place on 31 March 1962 and 3 April 1962."

The army had come to be viewed in a way that delighted the enemy and gave the friend no joy at all.

To illustrate the state its own affairs had fallen into, I quote the following from Lieutenant General Zahreddine, its own highest-ranking officer:

"...and I shall withdraw from this army, which has lost every military quality and disregarded even the simplest rules of discipline, causing ruin and instability to a country that never once withheld arms and equipment from it, setting aside three-quarters of its own budget from its own development and construction projects for the sake of an army it once respected, honored, and valued, an army that now harbors nothing toward it but rancor, hatred, and malice. The citizen now sees nothing in the streets but weapons pointed at his own chest, instead of at the enemy."[3]

Word reached us of a bloody clash between the unionist attackers and the secessionist defenders, leaving a number of dead and wounded among the officers and soldiers. We grieved, as did the people, over these tragedies shaking the very being of the army, and how could we not grieve, when the forces of both sides were made up of the homeland's own young men, trained for the day of dread, when the country would need them to defend itself, not to launch coup after coup, until we no longer knew either the reason or the count of these coups.

Monday, 12 April

Ten days, among the hardest days this country ever knew. We lived through them amid endless back and forth, rumor and bargaining, wearing on the nerves. After the union with Egypt's own stock had been rising, it now froze in place, and no official spoke of it seriously any longer, except Salah al-Bitar, who broadcast a statement calling for the return of a carefully studied union, and except for what was reported of the officers exiled from the country, statements suggesting they had grown weary of being branded secessionists, and had resolved to atone for their crime. But what could they do now, stripped as they were of their weapons and their power, having done nothing for the union themselves when power lay in their own hands?

We learned from the "mediators," Rafiq Bishur, Rashad Barmada, and our brother in "the Nasserist Five," Abdel Samad al-Fatih, that they were working seriously as a link between "the deputies under a cloud" and the military command, which was demanding the resignation of the reactionary deputies who had tampered with the Agrarian Reform Law and the nationalization laws. They had obtained a petition bearing their signatures resigning their parliamentary seats, and authorizing the President of the Republic with legislative powers, notwithstanding that this authorization violated the very text of their own constitution.

The great surprise was President al-Qudsi's own return to the presidency of the republic, after an arrest that had lasted fourteen days. He had submitted his resignation, as requested of him, twice, once to the chamber of deputies, and then a second time, when he was asked to address it instead to the army commander. He complied both times, willingly and agreeably.

His return became the object of sharp criticism from every quarter.

Rashad Barmada told us of himself that he had "done a deed history would remember him for."

It is clear that this deed was persuading the military command to release the President and the other detainees, which meant, at the same time, forming a civilian government committed to seeking this command's own opinion on political matters.

What caught our attention was the President's own insistence on dissolving the chamber of deputies through the resignation of its own members, rather than through a decree of his own. This was "a great wisdom" whose meaning escaped us.

But what is certain, beyond any doubt, is that the President signed a document with the army commander, in exchange for his own release. Lieutenant General Zahreddine published a photostat of it in his own memoirs.

Yet the constitutional problem was that the army commander had issued several legislative decree-decisions, some of them canceling every exceptional promotion, while President al-Qudsi was still under arrest. This, in effect, meant his own era had already come to a formal end.

And now he returns to the presidency. In what new capacity, though? Head of state, or President of the Republic, having twice submitted his own resignation from it? Or what, exactly?

Confusion piled upon confusion, darkness upon darkness.

Lieutenant General Zahreddine delivered a radio address, announcing "the return of legitimacy," welcoming President al-Qudsi and praising him at length. He said: "The army, in all its units and elements, stands in complete agreement on keeping itself apart from government and politics. Yet it remains bound to protect the highest national goals, embodied in the pursuit of a sound Arab union with the liberated Arab states, foremost among them Egypt, on carefully studied terms that preserve Syria's dignity and its own being, and spare it the errors and stumbles of the past. The new command has labored through these past two weeks, and has concluded, after careful study, that the highest national interest requires the army to declare its own rejection, and the people's rejection, of the President of the Republic's resignation, and to call upon him, in the name of the army and the people, to withdraw that resignation, and this great man has extended his hand to carry once more the greatest of trusts."

One of the jokes the people made on this occasion went as follows: the President of the Republic's mother wished to see him married, and a young woman from a well-known family was proposed to him. The girl's own mother said to her: my lady, we must ask for time to inquire into your son's personal conduct. The President's mother answered her: his conduct is the conduct of saints, from the presidency to prison, and from prison back to the presidency.

And so "the great man" returned to the Guest Palace, in the company of the army commander, on Friday morning.

Saturday the 14th

President al-Qudsi delivered a radio address in which he declared "that he had been compelled to take up governance because of the delicate circumstances," and said "that he would work toward an Arab union preserving Syria's own being and dignity."

I bear witness that his voice trembled, as though he felt the full weight of the crime he had committed, in accepting a presidency that had ended in the humiliation of arrest, and felt its weight again on being restored to it, after pledging to the army commander terms he did not himself believe in.

Lieutenant General Zahreddine published, by photostat, the text of the very document he had signed (in his memoirs, p. 244). The most notable pledge it contained, made "before God, the homeland, and the Syrian Arab people," included the following points:

a. In faith to the Arab unity the Syrian Arab people holds as an article of belief, the President of the Republic affirms his pursuit of an Arab union with the liberated Arab countries, foremost among them Egypt, on sound and proper foundations that preserve Syria's dignity and its own being.

My comment on this point: any union between Syria and Egypt would necessarily preserve Syria's dignity. Syria's dignity had in fact been preserved throughout the union that the secessionists themselves tore apart. Any repetition of this "condition" is nothing but poison spat from the mouth of a helpless, resentful man, using such language merely to buy time.

As for preserving Syria's own being, that is a matter negotiations alone would determine.

One "Nasserist" officer, who visited al-Qudsi in his place of detention along with officers from the new command who pretended in their conversation with him to be secessionists themselves, to draw out his own true feelings, told me that the man spoke to them with striking candor, saying: "Had you left me to my own work, I would have gone on forming one committee after another to study union, and one government after another, until the people grew numb and weary of the whole subject. At that point I would have set impossible conditions Abdel Nasser could never accept, and then we would have branded him as the one guilty of secession and of rejecting union, thereby closing the whole question of union with Egypt for good."

On this same occasion, it was reported of Major Hisham Abd Rabbo, back when he still had his own moment of power and influence, that when asked the reason for the President and al-Dawalibi's own arrest, he answered: the officers feared the two men might appeal to Abdel Karim Qasim for help, drawing him and his army in with British backing and blessing, to declare "the Fertile Crescent." He explained this fear of theirs by noting that al-Qudsi had not allowed the officer sent along with him to the Rutba conference to take part in the talks, so that they knew nothing at all of what he and Abdel Karim Qasim had actually agreed upon.

2. "In fulfillment of the principles of progressive socialism the President of the Republic holds as an article of belief," he affirms his pursuit of social justice and economic development, and of reconsidering the Agrarian Reform Law and the law regulating companies (the nationalization of the Five-Man Company) in keeping with these very principles.

My comment on this point is that it means canceling every amendment made under the secessionist era to the Agrarian Reform Law and to the socialist laws of July 1961. Dr. al-Qudsi accepted this, and I am certain he accepted it only under duress, without a shred of belief in it himself.

3. Since the President of the Republic also serves as chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, he affirms the necessity of treating this council's decisions as binding.

When news of this document reached Rushdi al-Kikhya's ears, he fell into deep gloom, for Dr. al-Qudsi had surrendered everything in it, in exchange for remaining in a chair that had already lost every last vestige of dignity.

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Endnotes:

[1] Mati' al-Samman writes, in his book Watan wa Askar (Nisan Publications, 1995), p. 129: "Colonel Muhaib al-Hindi came into the army commander's office, objecting to the decision to exile him... and swore by Almighty God that he had not slept at night out of guilt over the secession, and that he and his comrades had carried out these new arrests of government members and senior politicians in coordination with Cairo, in order to restore union with it, and that he had been determined to raise the flag of union once more in the heart of the Syrian capital. He then pulled a pistol from his pocket and very nearly fired a bullet into his own head, intending to take his own life then and there in the meeting. I stopped his rash act by seizing him with both hands, and those present intervened for the same purpose, and we wrested the pistol from him. This incident took place in the presence of General Zahreddine, in his own office." And the Greatest Messenger spoke truly when he said: "The best of you in the Age of Ignorance are the best of you in Islam." The conscience of those who still possess one must inevitably awaken after a stumble, and rouse itself after a slumber, but only for "those who possess a conscience" at all. As for those blinded by rancor, their hearts dried out by hatred, they are men made of the kind of stone that knows neither homeland nor mercy.

[2] From General Mustafa Tlass, Mir'at Hayati (The Mirror of My Life), Second Decade, First Edition 1995, p. 257.

[3] My Memoirs of the Secession Period, p. 220.