Year 1963 - Part 1: Rifts Between Zahreddine and al-Samman, and Rumors of al-Nahlawi's Return
Tuesday, 1 January
We spent New Year's Eve at the restaurant of the Orient Palace Hotel. We brought our daughter Maysa along with us for the first time, and had invited a few friends. For us, it was a comfortable dinner and an enjoyable evening, one whose hours let us forget, for a while, the pressure public events had been placing on our own nerves. I found myself at ease whenever the music was calm, and uneasy whenever it turned loud and raucous.
Should I say that the Americans ruined the true splendor of music, once they introduced these Negro dances under the name "jazz" and various other names?
In any case, this evening was a real departure from the wretched tug-of-war we live through daily. It comes but once a year, after all, and costs little enough that our own budget could easily bear it.
The new year dawns, and the secessionist regime crumbles further, day by day.
News reaches us of internal divisions within its own ranks, civilian and military alike. Lieutenant General Zahreddine, the army commander, seems to be weighing his own next move, uncertain which way to turn. In his own conversations with our brothers, he speaks "of working for union," yet in his own public speeches and statements, he appears to be clinging to the regime's own survival with both his teeth and his claws.
A bitter feud rages between the director of general intelligence, Brigadier General Hashem Hashem Agha, and the commander of the internal security forces, Brigadier General Mati' al-Samman.
Lieutenant General Zahreddine writes candidly, in his own memoirs,[1] of exactly what we had been hearing of in those very days.
He speaks of al-Samman with real reproach and disdain, saying he was a man impossible to deal with, who had fallen out with a great many senior officers, so much so that Brigadier General Hashem Hashem Agha submitted his own resignation, unless al-Samman were removed from his own post as commander of the internal security forces.[2] He writes that al-Samman had formed "an intelligence branch of his own, to spy on the intelligence directorate itself."
Elements of this branch frequently clashed with intelligence's own men, leading to casualties, such as those that occurred during Youssef Muzahim's own arrest. He writes that al-Samman sought a popular following of his own, summoning journalists and photographers to publicize himself, on any occasion or none at all, and that he had come to dominate the Minister of Interior himself.
I would note here that Mr. Youssef Muzahim had been a union-era minister, known for his own loyalty to the union and to its President, Abdel Nasser. He has lived in Egypt ever since the secession.
Zahreddine holds it against al-Samman that he "turned a blind eye to Abdel Karim al-Nahlawi and his own comrades' return into Syria," the very men expelled from the country by decision of the Homs military conference, in exchange for a share of the spoils, should al-Nahlawi's own coup, the one he had come to carry out, succeed.
The army commander failed in his own attempt to have Brigadier General Mati' al-Samman removed from his post, since the President of the Republic held firm in keeping him, and since "the Damascene officers rallied behind him." Khaled al-Azm, the head of government, backed him as well, and so the decision to send him back to the army failed, and the army commander submitted his own resignation, "though it was never accepted."
Al-Samman remained in his own post, working to tear the era down while imagining he was protecting it.
People laughed a great deal when news spread that President Dr. al-Qudsi had accepted the credentials of a foreign ambassador, only for it to emerge afterward that Syria had never actually recognized his own country in the first place.
The Foreign Ministry hurried to send a telegram of recognition post mortem, as the old Roman law put it, that is, "after the fact."
In a session with Mr. Rashad Barmada, a government minister, Dr. Abidin Hammadeh told him quite plainly that the regime was collapsing at an ever-accelerating pace, and that its own enemies were multiplying by the day.
Damascus, now beginning to wake from its own slumber, has become more than 70 percent Nasserist. Dr. Sami Kabbara is quoted as saying: no, in fact, Nasserists in Damascus now exceed 90 percent.
Mr. Rashad said he no longer knew anything, either about himself or about the state of the era. The Nasserists, as he put it, call him a hardened secessionist, while the secessionists accuse him of being a Nasserist. He had utterly lost his own bearings. A number of officers who had worked for the secession have been discharged, while others have been transferred to the Foreign Ministry.
And so the army becomes a victim of its own interference in politics, losing, day by day, officers of real caliber, men the state spent the very lifeblood of its own citizens training, so that they might stand, in the hour of hardship, against Israel, this being their own true mission, not suppressing internal demonstrations against a regime whose own men have themselves admitted its corruption, nor serving as a mere police force, working for one man and fighting against another.
Friday the 4th
A great reception was held in Aleppo for Mr. Issam al-Attar.
Alaeddine al-Jabiri hosted a dinner in his own honor, inviting consuls, politicians, senior government officials, and neighborhood leaders alike.
This was a demonstration aimed squarely at the government's own reputation and standing, the Brotherhood using it to declare their own disavowal of any part in the era. This same Alaeddine had once been "subject" to agrarian reform proceedings.
He had once come to me complaining of his own dire financial straits, and I helped him as best I could through the Supreme Agrarian Reform Committee, of which I was a member.
He never once thought, God forgive him, to send me a telegram of condolence on my own mother's death.
I have come to know the true nature of these "beys." They are forever men of established rights, never matched by a single social obligation of their own.
Thursday the 10th
Among the "reliable" news reported by the newspaper Al-Manar is that I have signed a contract to teach at the Libyan University, and will be leaving the country within days.
I have no idea where Al-Manar got hold of this "reliable" news, which I myself have never heard of. The former deputy Habib Kahhale's own newspaper, in a piece both comic and tragic, attacked the previous al-Azma government, accusing it of "having been in contact with the Nasserists, and of working to restore union with Egypt."
Its own ministers rushed to deny this claim, with Bashir al-Azma, Rashad Barmada, and Riyad al-Maidani all denying this "fabricated" allegation, insisting they had never once given even a moment's thought to so grave an undertaking.
Now, brothers, former head of that government and some of its own ministers:
Your own contacts with us were constant, and Dr. al-Azma personally appealed to me for my support of his own efforts toward union, asking us to back him with a telegram affirming his own unionist course. I recall him telling me: "Don't leave us as prey to these vicious secessionists."
Perhaps you also forget that you once asked one of us to travel to Cairo, to persuade Abdel Nasser to change his own position toward you.
Have you truly forgotten all of this? Or is it simply a case of "a red face, with no lump caught in the throat"?
Today we received a copy of a decision issued by Minister of Education Rashad Barmada, numbered 5532/4/K, dated 31 December 1962, addressed to the Directorate of Education in Damascus, reading as follows:
"We have decided to admit Marwan Assa, holder of the preparatory-school certificate, born in 1974, into the first year of secondary school, exempting him from the grade requirement, and considering his attendance to date from the day he enrolled at the school."
This student's own admission was barred on two separate grounds: insufficient grades, and insufficient attendance. Here is a fine sample of the "appeasements" secessionist loyalists manage to secure. This student's own father is none other than Mr. Ahmad Assa, owner of the newspapers Al-Ra'i al-Aam and Al-Sada al-Aam, one of the ugliest secessionist faces of all. Yet since he supports the era with his own poisoned pen, the law simply had to be broken, and his own son exempted from the admission requirements, to keep him content with the era, so that he might go on backing it with fabrication and forgery alike.
As a certain group of unscrupulous men once put it, the end justifies the means.
And in Damascus's own air, a "pungent" smell hangs, of a military conspiracy being prepared by Abdel Karim al-Nahlawi and his own group of officers, those who had carried out the first secession before being expelled from the country following the Homs conference I spoke of earlier.
Rumor has it that al-Nahlawi and his group slipped back into Syria from abroad, crossing the Turkish border near Bab al-Hawa, and that Mati' al-Samman, himself a fellow Damascene, covered for them and joined their own ranks.
Mr. Said al-Abbar, owner of the newspaper Al-Liwa, the Muslim Brotherhood's own mouthpiece, told me of this.
These officers are said to be spreading word that the Communists have seized control of the army, under the leadership of Brigadier General Khalil al-Mawsili, and that the regime, from the presidency on down through every rank, has become nothing but an outward facade, with no real power or resource of its own left at all.
This journalist assured me that some major event would take place "within the next two days." I confess this surprise genuinely startled me.
A handful of "Damascene" officers are utterly incapable, on their own, of carrying out a coup, which means they must have struck some agreement with strike forces from within the army itself.
It has become known that the commander of the internal security forces has become one of their own supporters. But is it really conceivable that strike forces would back them merely to carry out yet another coup? Or is there instead some unionist current at work, as I have heard, with al-Nahlawi and his brothers seeking to atone for their own monstrous crime, by severing the very bonds of the secession they themselves once tied?
But on what possible basis?
Tomorrow is not far off, and we shall see what it brings.
Friday the 11th
I visited Mr. As'ad al-Kourani, after much hesitation.
Mr. As'ad serves as Minister of Justice and Religious Endowments in Khaled al-Azm's government, formed on 17 September 1962.
He is among the signatories of the very first petition supporting the secession. He belongs, as far as I know, to no political party, but wades through the political waters through his own ties to right-wing circles, and through the legal expertise he is well known for as a prominent lawyer.
In our own conversation, "His Excellency" returned to the subject of unifying the People's Party and the National Party, to confront the leftist current represented by Akram al-Hourani.
I told him: this is a matter that no longer concerns me, since I am no longer tied to any party at all, assuming any legitimate parties even still exist, given that every party was dissolved at the very outset of the union.
I asked him: isn't Mr. al-Hourani your own partner in power, one of its firmest pillars? Why, then, do you resist him and stand against him? He answered that al-Hourani no longer commanded any real strength to rely on within the army, since most of his own prominent supporters had been discharged, though he remained active, adventurous, and never one to shrink from any undertaking, however reckless.
Mr. al-Kourani assured me he was "determined" to undo the damage done by both Nihad al-Qasim (Minister of Justice under the union) and Ahmad Sultan (Minister of Justice in the secessionist era).
At this point, Justice Zafer al-Mawsili arrived, a friend of both Mr. al-Kourani and myself, whom I had appointed at the Ministry of Finance after Nihad al-Qasim had removed him, along with the other judges dismissed during his own tenure.
As'ad Bey showed plain fear of the Communists reaching power, saying he would not put it past them to drag nationalists like himself through the streets, exactly as Iraq's own Communists once did to nationalists under Abdel Karim Qasim.
He told us the story of his own six-year-old grandson, Nafeh. The child's own parents had moved him from their home in the al-Muhafaza quarter to his own house, seeking safety. As the child was walking down the street, he overheard people saying they would "soon slaughter them all." The child remained terrified for over a month, screaming for help in his sleep, and As'ad Bey himself lived in fear of some "mob" attack as well.
He told me he had been with the President of the Republic, who mentioned my own mother's death to him, and seized the occasion "to lavish fragrant praise on this noble man, who never once failed to help friend and foe alike," when he had held power (meaning me, in his own remarks).
He may well have meant "His Excellency's" own help to me, in securing the presidency of the Arab World Bank, during the union.
Saturday the 12th
The newspaper Al-Liwa, mouthpiece of the Muslim Brotherhood, published a statement from the Brotherhood's own Supreme Guide, Issam al-Attar, giving his own view on the question of union.
The man's own remarks on this subject have always been marked by ambiguity, perhaps even evasiveness. Today's statement, though, was considerably clearer.
He said the following:
"We are men of principle and of standards we believe in and hold ourselves to, judging both people and circumstances by them, never straying from them in either word or deed, whether to the left or to the right. We judged Abdel Nasser by these very same principles and standards, and fought his own dictatorial rule, and everything we saw as deviation, at home and abroad, in the days he ruled over us. We remain today exactly as we were in the past. We stand against dictatorship and deviation, but we always stand for union."
He set three conditions for the union he embraces:
1. A constitutional life enabling the people to take charge of its own affairs.
2. Liberation from colonialism and its own schemes.
3. Establishing union through legitimate means, not "through blood."
In fairness, Mr. al-Attar has secured a position within the secessionist era's own politics far greater than his own true stature, one he owes not to his own competence, but to the very weakness eating away at the era's own foundations.
Thursday the 17th
We had thought the black-hearted press had made its own truce with us.
But we were wrong to think so.
The newspaper Al-Sarkha (owned by the Communist Ahmad Alloush) came out today bearing the following enormous headline:
For Syria's Sake... Burn Them... Bury Them Alive
I reproduce some of what it said, for the record and as a lesson:
"O men of the state, O men of security, O men of the judiciary, strike these saboteurs with an iron fist. Strike without mercy, without pity, without humanity.
Treat them exactly as Abdel Nasser would love to treat us. Slaughter them exactly as Abdel Nasser wishes to slaughter us. Kill them exactly as Abdel Nasser kills us. Bury them alive."
And yet the public prosecution never brought this newspaper's own owner to trial, to deter him from this criminal incitement to murder.
Nor did we ourselves bring any case against him, feeling that doing so would grant him an importance he does not deserve. Did the imam of the "Dakk al-Bab" mosque not say, only days ago, in his own Friday sermon, that we were "apostates," and that he issued a religious ruling permitting our own blood to be shed with impunity? And yet we paid him no mind either, for what he says is nothing more than a dog barking in the wilderness, one just as ready, should union ever return, to issue a ruling permitting the blood of union's own opponents to be shed instead. These are the jurists of whichever sultan happens to be in power. Yet both incidents carry a real and certain significance, that the general state of affairs has become utterly chaotic, and that the state itself has become nothing but a name on a map, existing nowhere but on paper. No one even knows anymore who truly governs this country.
Jurisdiction is no longer defined by law, but drawn instead by the will of whoever is strong enough to seize it, and bend it to his own purposes.
And once again, my own thoughts turn to that old man, still caged.
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Endnotes:
[1] P. 391 and following.
[2] See the photostat of the resignation letter, same reference, p. 392.