Chapter 10, Part 1: Husni al-Za'im's Coup of 30 March 1949

I have never felt such great unease as I feel now, trying to write about the military coups whose events I witnessed one after another. I have often discussed them with politicians and others, people who were at their heart or on their edges, hoping to reach something like a conviction. But each of them speaks of a kind of personal "impression" and draws whatever conclusions his imagination allows.. Even those who saw one scene of these tragic plays do not know what happened in the other scenes.. For example, a junior officer told me that it was he who shot Husni al-Za'im and Muhsin al-Barazi.. but another officer told the same story quite differently, also in my presence.

I believe that if the hero of the coup himself spoke of his motives, he would say that he launched his operation only for the public good and to preserve the unity of the homeland and its existence, which was threatened with dismemberment.. purely innocent patriotic motives with which no foreigner had anything to do.. And he usually does not forget to pour out his fury on "the conspirators among the dictatorial military and the professional civilian politicians who plundered the country's wealth and deprived of it the dispossessed classes who have the legitimate right to it".. The foreign writers who say they knew of the coups in advance differ among themselves in what they say.. even though they work in one service (an embassy, or a foreign ministry) of one state.. or of several cooperating states!

Our writers and researchers are quick to seize on the foreign "secret foreign-office documents" that have been released, as though they were truths that falsehood cannot touch from before or behind.. For the cables of foreign "ambassadors" carry the impressions and conclusions of those who sent them, whether from what they hear from people close to the putschists or from their intelligence agents, who pick them up from the crumbs of conversation.

Yet I do not at all rule out that some influential putschists were in league with foreign intelligence services in planning and carrying out their ill-omened operations.. But I have no proof of that, for I had no part in any coup before it was carried out, and I never once contacted a foreigner or a diplomat about such harmful operations.

I have read much of what has been written about the history of this period. But there are other writings I hear of without having seen them.. So my personal observations and what I have drawn from the events will carry basic weight in writing this chapter, because I do not trust what many Arab and foreign researchers have written on its subject. Even so, there are writings worthy of respect for their neutrality and objectivity, but they are not the general rule.[1]

This chapter contains three sections:

The Coup of Husni al-Za'im
The Coup of Sami al-Hinnawi
The Coup of Adib al-Shishakli

Section One
The Coup of Husni al-Za'im

To show how obscure the motives of the coups are, I quote here samples of what has been said about this coup, to put a finger on the hidden wounds of truth in matters that unfold behind the curtain. Even so, it is reasonable to try to uncover those who held the decisive strings, on the basis of certain clues. And I hasten to admit that these are clues open to proof to the contrary, because conclusive evidence does not reach our hands, and remains until further notice among the unknown, the secrets of foreign intelligence services, or locked in the breasts of those who held it and have taken it with them into eternity.

The American Miles Copeland wrote the following about Husni al-Za'im's coup in his book "The Game of Nations":

".. The situation in Syria was heading toward a political explosion whose signs were appearing on the horizon, because al-Quwatli and his supporters insisted on their positions and refused to take any liberalizing steps. But Keeley (head of the mission in Damascus at the time) reluctantly accepted that the overthrow of the existing regime by men of the army would open the way for the sound elements in society to come forward and take on the burdens of government, after the violent bent of al-Quwatli's regime had prevented them from playing their effective role in government and society..

Husni al-Za'im's coup of 30 March 1949 was of our preparation and planning. The political action team, under the direction of Major "Meade", established regular friendly relations with Husni al-Za'im, who was then chief of staff of the army.. Through this friendship Major Meade suggested "to Husni al-Za'im the idea of carrying out a military coup, and we took on the task of drawing up its whole plan and working out all its complicated details.. Tongues began to say that Husni al-Za'im was no more than one of the Americans' boys"."[2]

Gordon H. Torrey wrote the following in his book "Syrian Politics and the Military":

"Husni al-Za'im's coup, according to one of those who took part in it, was conceived on the day Faisal al-Asali attacked the army in a closed session of the Chamber of Deputies. Al-Za'im, who was army commander, gathered a number of senior officers at his headquarters in Quneitra and discussed with them a proposal to present a memorandum of protest to President al-Quwatli. The memorandum was drawn up and Colonel Bahij Kallas carried it to the President of the Republic. Although the letter contained an ultimatum, al-Quwatli hinted that the officers were behaving like village headmen presenting petitions. Kallas advised the President to give the memorandum great importance, and then returned to Quneitra.. After that Husni al-Za'im and Kallas met President al-Quwatli, and he seems not to have considered the situation delicate enough to require action against the malcontents..

Some officers were arrested on charges of corruption and bribery..

On the twenty-ninth of March al-Za'im put the finishing touches to the plan of the coup, arrived in Damascus at half past two after midnight, and at once gave orders to arrest the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the directors of the police and the gendarmerie."[3]

The journalist Nadhir Fansa, Husni al-Za'im's brother-in-law, wrote the following in his book "The Days of Husni al-Za'im":

"Once al-Za'im came to my house early.. He said to me: we will spend the evening at your place tonight, so prepare some food and drink for us. This was on 24 March 1949. In the evening the officers began to arrive at my house.. There were about 14 of them, all in civilian dress.. The company was complete when Husni al-Za'im arrived.. Among the officers present I remember Sami al-Hinnawi, Ihsan Mardam, Ibrahim al-Husseini, Muhammad Nassar and Colonel Mahmud Bunyan. Everyone began to drink, even Husni al-Za'im, who did not drink because he suffered from diabetes, drank that night.

I understood from their first conversations that the spark of the coup came from the continual attacks in the Chamber of Deputies by Faisal al-Asali.

The army commander, Husni al-Za'im, was angry, and the agitation was visible, or suppressed, on the faces of the other officers.. It appeared from what al-Za'im said.. that he had raised the idea of a coup with other officers at a meeting he held in Quneitra. But they had found that concern for the homeland, in that critical period of confrontation with the Zionist enemy, required the idea of a coup to be shelved. Instead of a coup, al-Za'im and his senior officers at the Quneitra meeting had arrived at a proposal to draw up a memorandum that would serve as a warning to the politicians..

The memorandum was prepared, and al-Za'im took it to President al-Quwatli at his home.. and handed it to him in the presence of the Minister of Defense and Prime Minister, Khalid al-Azm.[4] Instead of saying that they would attend to what was in the memorandum, they said: is this what the army has come to? Have the officers started acting like headmen and writing up reports? Al-Za'im and the officers in my house vied with each other in exposing the neglect of which the Syrian army had been the victim.. At one o'clock after midnight it appeared from the gathering that the coup was bound to happen. Al-Za'im asked me to bring the Holy Quran, and I brought it, and the officers one after another swore on the Holy Book to keep the secret: the secret of this meeting and the secret of the decision on the coup, set for 29 March 1949."[5]

Khalid al-Azm wrote the following in his memoirs:

"President Shukri al-Quwatli said to me: come with me to watch the trial of the weapons and ammunition we have recently bought. So we got into his car and went to the Mezzeh plain, where the commander-in-chief, Husni al-Za'im, was waiting for us with a group of officers..

The soldiers began the trials with three anti-aircraft guns, but we noticed that they were unsuccessful, since many of the rounds did not leave the muzzle. The Ministry of Defense had bought these guns and ammunition from the company known as the "Lesser Five", made up of Fa'iz al-Maliki, Rafiq Rida Sa'id, Ibrahim Mardam, Adil al-Hanbali and Khalid al-Ayyubi.[6]

We went to the army depots, with Husni al-Za'im and his aides, and there we entered one of the storehouses. The President began walking among many sacks and crates, asking about their contents and pretending to be satisfied.. until we came to a group of tins filled with clarified butter. He asked for one of them to be opened, and it was opened, and we saw that the color of the butter was nearer to black. The President asked for a frying pan and a kerosene stove.. A piece of the butter was put in the pan over the flame.. and it had scarcely heated when a foul smell rose from it, so that we had to hold our noses.. The President asked for a tin of the butter to be carried to his car so that he could take it with him for testing..

I went straight to the Ministry of Defense, and Husni al-Za'im followed me. I asked him who was making these deals, and he said: a purchasing committee headed by Colonel Bustani. I ordered the butter to be analyzed in the laboratory.. and the results showed that it contained foreign substances harmful to health. I ordered Husni al-Za'im to refer Bustani to the court, and al-Za'im was greatly upset.

At the session of the Chamber of Deputies held on 17 March 1949, the deputy Faisal al-Asali launched a violent attack on Husni al-Za'im, accusing him of treason and of conspiring with King Abd Allah..

President al-Quwatli went back to the barracks a second time.. and saw the soldiers wiping rust off the cartridges. He asked one of the officers: is this ammunition left over from the French army? He was told: no, it is a new purchase.. Whereupon he called one of the colonels and slapped him across the face.. The investigation established that this ammunition had been hidden underground in Italy, and the company had imported it at a low price and delivered it to the Ministry of Defense.. Husni al-Za'im sensed how badly things would end for him if the government continued the investigation.. and there rose before him memories of the hard days he had lived through, dismissed from the army, pursued before the courts, penniless and destitute, turning to gambling to earn his living..

He managed to win over some officers.. Alongside that, some deputies who were angry with Shukri al-Quwatli, headed by Akram al-Hourani, who had many ties with a large number of officers.. were making efforts among the officers..

And I do not rule out the existence of foreign hands that sought to overturn the situation in Syria.."[7]

Dr. Nazim al-Qudsi says the following in his memoirs recorded on cassette tapes: "In 1947 I got to know Husni al-Za'im, who was military commander of the Deir ez-Zor region, through his brother-in-law, my cousin Majid. He proposed to me that he carry out a coup, and I told him: this is dangerous for you, and the air force can wipe you out.. From that day I realized that things were being arranged by America."

So we have no conclusive documents showing the hands that played the decisive role in preparing Husni al-Za'im's coup.

Even the documents that the British Foreign Office allowed to be published 30 years after the coup shed no searching light on the secrets.[8]

The secret cable sent by the British Embassy in Damascus to the Foreign Office, no. 122 of 31 March 1949, says: "The coup led by Husni al-Za'im has succeeded, and its main aim is the overthrow of Shukri al-Quwatli. So far the coup has won no support from political figures except Emir Adel Arslan..".

The second cable, no. 257 of 1 April, says: "De Margerie, director of the Africa and Middle East department, informed us that only scant information on the reasons for the coup has reached the French government in secret. Members of the French mission met al-Za'im, and he appeared tired and dispirited and was unable to give any clear account. The prevailing impression at the French Foreign Ministry is that the coup may have been military ambition in the traditional South American manner".

Cable no. 376 of 6 April 1949 said the following:

"The French Foreign Ministry is preparing for early recognition of the new Syrian regime, but would prefer this to be done in agreement with the American and British governments.

Husni al-Za'im is seeking to please the West, and so he is planning to put 2,000 communists in Tadmur prison..".

And document no. 159 of 7 April:

"Husni al-Za'im affirmed that the coup had prevented a bloody popular revolution and that the coup was carried out to fulfill the people's hopes..".

In document no. 214: Sami Kabbara met Mr. Wandas (the British intelligence man) and told him that if al-Za'im's government did not receive immediate help, the new regime would collapse.. and that if the British government recognized Husni al-Za'im's regime, it should ask him to hand power back to the people.

The Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote on 11 April 1949: "This coup represents the struggle between the imperialist powers in the Near East, and also reflects the hostile plans of these powers against the Soviet Union.

And the British organized this coup as part of their plans to establish the Fertile Crescent. The proof of this is the arrival in Damascus of Bulok, the director of British intelligence, and the support of the reactionary parties for that coup."[9]

In this mixture of opinions the truth remains a riddle still waiting to be solved. I, who lived through that grave event and the events that followed it, formed a personal view drawn from studying the facts: I do not clear all the men of the coups of foreign contacts. And while the unanimous testimony is that al-Hinnawi was above these accusations, because of his simplicity, perhaps his political naivety, and his purity, those who made him the front for a coup they had planned are not above suspicion. But I do not rule out personal considerations in the coups either.

I am convinced that this series of tragic coups brought Syria, at home, to political paralysis, fragmentation and a halt in development, and abroad to the loss of all respect and all capacity for national action, because the putschists swung between Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, between the French, the English and the Americans, and then between the Western camp and the Eastern camp.

I will speak of the position of Rushdi al-Kikhya and the People's Party on Husni al-Za'im's coup, relying on my memory and on some papers I have kept.

The general atmosphere began to darken when the Prime Minister, Jamil Mardam, was forced to submit his government's resignation in the wake of huge popular demonstrations against it, because of its responsibility for the loss of Palestine and the accusations of corruption against some of its ministers.

To throw dust in people's eyes and absorb the popular anger, President al-Quwatli charged President Hashim al-Atassi with forming a new cabinet, and he accepted. But the presidency put every obstacle in his way, and he could find nothing to do but decline and return to Homs.

His declining opened the way for Khalid al-Azm to be charged with forming the government, which is what al-Quwatli had been planning, and he formed it on 16 December 1948.

I do not deny that we were not comfortable with this cabinet, because its head had been Syria's ambassador in Paris, and because most of its members were from outside the Chamber of Deputies; it contained only two deputies, Muhammad al-Ayish (Agriculture) and Ahmad al-Rifa'i (Justice).[10]

This government concluded an agreement with France on 7 February 1949 to settle the financial problems with it. No one had any serious objection to this technical agreement. On 16 February 1949 it also concluded an agreement with the American oil company on laying pipelines across Syria from the Saudi oil fields to the Mediterranean Sea. Shukri al-Quwatli and all his ministers signed the decree ratifying the agreement, and it was referred to the Chamber of Deputies for approval.

This agreement was the subject of controversy and opposition from the opposition deputies. A series of meetings was held throughout the country to oppose it, and stormy demonstrations led by students took place in the big cities.

The opposition rested on America's unjust stand on the Palestine question.. The wound in every Arab heart was still bleeding.. and no one was prepared to forgive America its crime in supporting the partition of Palestine, its rush to recognize Israel in the first minutes after the United Nations partition resolution, and its desperate use of pressure and threats on some poor states to make them vote for this ill-omened partition.

The liberal deputies also considered this agreement grossly unfair to Syria's rights, because it gave it no more than crumbs from the table. It granted Syria 20 thousand pounds sterling a year in exchange for exempting the company from every tax or fee, giving it priority in Syrian ports and the right to build roads and railways. To the lump sum would be added a percentage paid to Syria on the basis of the quantities of oil passing through it in the pipelines, not to exceed a maximum of 13 million pounds sterling if the quantity of oil passing through the pipelines reached 6 million tons or more. This was a hypothesis unlikely ever to be realized in practice.

So it was not destined to see the light through the Chamber of Deputies, and it lay dormant until Husni al-Za'im's coup came.

Besides this, Rushdi al-Kikhya saw a grave danger crouching on our southern borders, so regional rivalries had to be abandoned and the facts faced frankly and firmly.. His conviction was that events had shown that Syria was in a critical position facing a prepared and equipped enemy, and that on its own it was no longer able to defend itself or to liberate Palestine as its national duty required. But he was also against the policy of Arab axes.. so he did not want to enlist himself and his party in the camp of those working to encircle Egypt and push it out of the Arab East. His motive was Arab, driven by principle alone, because he had no personal ambitions for state office or state money..

And so the country lived in a state of frayed nerves, not knowing what tomorrow held. But what tomorrow held was not long in coming.

Endnotes:

[1] Among these works are the memoirs of Rashed al-Kaylani, second edition, 1997, for which I wrote the foreword.

[2] The Game of Nations, published in London in 1969 and translated into Arabic by Marwan Khayr, Beirut, p. 49.

[3] Translated by Mahmud Falaha, Dar al-Jamahir, second edition, 1969, p. 132.

[4] See the text of the memorandum in al-Azm's memoirs, vol. 2, p. 186.

[5] Ayyam Husni al-Za'im (The Days of Husni al-Za'im: 137 Days That Shook Syria), Dar al-Afaq al-Jadida, Beirut, second edition, 1983, p. 22.

[6] It is well known that the "Greater Five" company was the Damascus spinning and weaving company formed by Anwar al-Dusuqi, Adil al-Khuja, Abd al-Hadi al-Rabbat, Abd al-Hamid Diab and Anwar al-Qutb.
This company played a bad part in the parliamentary elections and backed certain candidates, especially Dr. Ma'mun al-Kuzbari, which took it out of the sphere of the economy and into political battles, and it was nationalized.. later..
Some members of the Chamber of Deputies were invited to this exercise, among them Rushdi al-Kikhya and the author of this book.

[7] Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 186.

[8] Some of the documents were published by the magazine al-Watan al-Arabi, published in Paris, in its issue of 24-30 November 1980, pp. 35-38.

[9] Among the writings that have dealt with the events of that period of Syria's political history is a series of 18 articles published in the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Siyasa in 1989, prepared by "the newspaper's Information and Studies Center". They are worth reading.

[10] Dr. Muhsin al-Barazi (Minister of Education), Hasan Jabbara (Minister of Finance), Adil al-Azma (Minister of the Interior), Majd al-Din al-Jabiri (Minister of Public Works, who had been defeated in the Aleppo elections of 1947) and Hunayn Sahnawi (Minister of Economy) were not deputies.