Days of the Union - The First Year - Part 2: Homad's Appointment as Minister of Justice and the Saudi Plot to Assassinate Nasser

Tuesday, 4 March

As of today, President Abdel Nasser is still in Damascus, and we read in some newspapers that he has begun to make contact with certain Syrian political figures. It was said that he met with Fakhir al-Kayali, a member of the National Party who, under Sabri al-Asali's leadership, had joined what they called the "National Gathering," in which Khalid al-Azm held the foremost place, while the politicized officers, under Akram al-Hourani's political leadership, effectively ran it, for a period of five hours, and that he also met for two and a half hours with Ihsan al-Jabiri, who was likewise a member of that National Gathering.

We found these consultations strange, for Fakhir al-Kayali held no such leadership, not even over his own former National Party. Indeed, members of that party held it against both him and Sabri al-Asali that they had thrown themselves at what was called the "National Gathering" merely to obtain a ministerial post. As for Ihsan al-Jabiri, he had ridden the wave of this Gathering once he realized that the political leadership of Aleppo had not passed down to him as an inheritance from his late brother Saadallah, and so he fell in line behind the supporters of the men with the sword. He is remembered for his defeat in the 1947 elections, as he is remembered for his weak victory in the 1954 elections.

We have every right to praise the awareness of our people whenever the 1947 elections are recalled, for they put an end to the leadership of the feudal and capitalist "families," and the popular uprising carried me, along with al-Dawalibi, Qanbar, and al-Sibahi, into the seats of parliament.

Since that "decisive battle" in Syria's political history, the banner of victory has remained fastened to the brows of the "popular leaders" in the battles of the ever-growing will of the mass of the people.

Wednesday, 5 March

I was giving a lecture, in the second period, to the final-year students of the Faculty of Law, when Dr. Fouad Shabbat, the dean of the faculty, surprised me by entering in the middle of the lecture, something that was never customary. I did not stand for him, for I had once witnessed a similar situation at the University of Paris, where the lecturing professor did not stand for the dean, out of respect for learning itself. He whispered in my ear that the Egyptian ambassador was asking me to speak with him at once by telephone on an important matter. I asked the students' leave and stepped out from among them, and I could hear some of their remarks ringing in my ears: "It's the ministry."

Ambassador Mahmoud Riad, an old friend who had played an important role in bringing Syria and Egypt closer together, and who later became Egypt's Foreign Minister and Secretary-General of the Arab League, told me that Anwar Sadat, who was in Damascus, wanted to see me at once. I told him I was in the middle of a lecture that would end in half an hour, and that I would be with him within the hour. When I went in to see him, and we exchanged greetings and inquiries after each other's health and circumstances, he asked me: "What do you think of the proposed system of government for the newborn Republic?" I answered that I thanked God, glory be to Him, for His grace in bringing about a union that Arab nationalists had worked for since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance, and that it had come about without coercion or violence. I did not personally believe that Syria, with its four million citizens, could, with its modest resources, one day become a great power capable of deterring the Jewish state, which is sponsored by the Western powers, America above all, as heir to the British conspiracy against the Arabs, especially since the United Nations Charter is a yoke around the necks of the weak and a sharp weapon in the hands of the strong. It is regrettable that we have proven to the world that we are the weak ones, after two crushing defeats at the hands of Israel, the first in 1948 and the second in 1956. And so I am glad of the Union and its state, and we shall support it in all our work with complete sincerity, and what I hope for is that the new order be built on foundations of integrity and human dignity.

At this remark, he surprised me by saying: "Then you must bear your share of the responsibility and take part in the new government. President Abdel Nasser has chosen you for the Ministry of Justice." It was known to us that a single government for the Republic would be formed under Abdel Nasser's presidency, with two ministerial councils, one for the Northern Region (Syria) and the other for the Southern Region (Egypt).

This unexpected offer was an embarrassing surprise to me. I had, after all, formerly belonged to the People's Party, and it had not been looked upon comfortably by those holding the reins of power among the visible civilians, nor by those standing behind them in a shadow that was hardly hidden at all, and they must surely have given the new President a distorted picture of this party and its leaders. Moreover, ministerial work was nothing new to me even before the new union came about, for I had already experienced it three times before, and the experience had not been a comfortable one. I made my true feelings known to Sadat, and told him that I was already a certain supporter of the Union, and that it would be better for me, and perhaps for the country, if I devoted myself to university teaching, which I loved, and through which I had realized a sense of self that teaching had become a part of. I had begun as a primary school teacher, then a teacher at the secondary school in Aleppo and its teacher training college, and had ended up a professor at the Faculty of Law at the Syrian University (today's Damascus University), and I wished to continue carrying out my mission of teaching at the university. Sadat opposed my arguments, and insisted that the new situation required "sincere men" known for their sincerity, and that the government would include "friends" of mine, whom I knew and would be comfortable working with. He did not name anyone, though he came close to hinting at the name of Dr. Nazim al-Qudsi, the second man in the People's Party and one of its prominent politicians. I accepted the generous offer, since the task carried national dimensions. I thanked the President for his trust, and put my faith in God.

But I asked Sadat whether he was aware of what Mr. al-Mahayni had confided to me, and he said that he was, and that their information in Cairo confirmed that America would not let the new union rest easy.

I often asked myself who had recommended me, ahead of all the other party members, some of whom had more experience in government than I did. My thinking led me to conclude that it must have been Akram al-Hourani who had mentioned my name to the President, so much so that I once thanked him for this choice while at the same time reproaching him for it, since, in truth, I preferred my work at the university, alongside the practice of law.

I recall that he apologized in a modest whisper, and praised my honesty and my impartiality in government work.

I continued to hold this belief for many long years, until I read, in the pamphlet that Mr. al-Hourani published during the secession period (dated 20 May 1962), in which he attacked Abdel Nasser and the Union, the following passage:

"What (the President) actually did, from the very first month of the union, was to choose the ministers of both the Syrian and Egyptian regions himself and issue a decree appointing them, without issuing any republican decree appointing a head of an executive council for the Syrian region who would himself choose the ministers he wished to work with."

Thus it was confirmed to me that it was Abdel Nasser himself who chose the ministers of the Union, and that he involved no one else in this decision. It is certain, however, that he consulted those he trusted.

That evening, President Abdel Nasser delivered a momentous speech, announcing at its outset the provisional constitution of the United Arab Republic, and then dropping a bombshell that caused a worldwide sensation: that King Saud was financing a plot to blow up Abdel Nasser's plane in mid-air as he returned to Egypt, in order to destroy the union's state while it was still a newborn in its cradle. His representative in this plot was the father of his Syrian wife, As'ad Ibrahim, along with a member of the Chamber of Deputies, the lawyer Aziz Abbad. The plan was to win over Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj, the strongman of Syria and head of the army's Second Bureau (the intelligence directorate), and to buy his loyalty with an enormous sum of money, two million pounds sterling, as al-Sarraj himself specified at his press conference, where he published the numbers of the checks he had received, whose photographs the next day's newspapers printed, exposing the details of this base conspiracy, of which President Abdel Nasser had been informed step by step.[1]

Nineteen million Syrian lira entered the state treasury, a valuable boost to the "Northern" budget, which I made use of when I became Minister of the Treasury months later. One million lira "went missing" (since the two million pounds were worth twenty million Syrian lira) out of the original sum of the "deal."

I recall asking al-Sarraj one day about this missing million, and he smiled and said it had gone into the pockets of the "honorable intermediaries." Al-Sarraj won a great deal of esteem and respect for this affair.

I visited Dr. Nazim al-Qudsi in his room at the Orient Palace Hotel in Damascus, where he was in the habit of staying, along with Rushdi al-Kikhya, for many years past, and I told him, as a friend, of my conversation with Sadat. He told me in turn that he had been summoned from Aleppo for consultation, and that he had met with Sadat, who had spoken to him only in general terms, without offering him any part in government activity.

My own sense was that Sadat had summoned him to take part in the government, as one of the prominent political figures of Aleppo, so that there would be two of us from Aleppo in the cabinet, a custom we had grown used to in political life, and an established convention that every cabinet include a minister or more from each of the major provinces. It appears, however, that heavy pressure was brought to bear on Sadat to exclude him, from the politicized officers and from Akram al-Hourani, on the grounds that he was a "reactionary" and one of the "Baghdad Pact group," a charge that was false from beginning to end.

I refuted this charge with arguments and documents in a book I wrote about the People's Party, in the service of history.

He was indeed excluded, with no mention ever made either of his being summoned from Aleppo for consultation, or of his being entrusted with any task in the new order. In this way I became the sole minister from Aleppo and from the "People's Party," which the establishment of the Union had dissolved, just as it had dissolved the other Syrian parties. This was a state of affairs that did nothing to please many of the members of our former party, who had always held against me my "leftism," considering me closer to socialist principles than to them. Fakhir al-Kayali was a member of the cabinet, though he represented Harim in the elections, and had been a member of the National Party, which had also been dissolved.

The reasons behind al-Qudsi's summons to Damascus by Sadat became clear to me thirty-eight years after that summons. The lawyer Atef Sultan, who had emigrated to Beirut, as he told me, after the death of his wife, visited me at my home in the al-Malki district of Damascus, on the morning of Monday, 19 May 1997. He was one of the founders of the People's Party, and told me, as we were reminiscing about the past, that Anwar Sadat had indeed offered a post to Nazim al-Qudsi, and that al-Qudsi had asked his leave to travel to Aleppo to finish some of his own affairs before returning to Damascus, but that Sadat had telephoned him in Aleppo and asked him to consider their conversation frozen for the time being.

Al-Qudsi related what had happened to him to some members of the dissolved People's Party, and added that both he and Rushdi al-Kikhya stood with the Union and in its service, whether as officials working within it or simply as ordinary citizens.

Mr. Sultan added that they had all concluded, at the time, that Sadat's offer to al-Qudsi had been a serious one, but that heavy pressure had been brought to bear on President Abdel Nasser by al-Hourani, al-Bizri, and their friends, to exclude al-Qudsi, and this is indeed what happened.

Thursday, 6 March

Today I went, with members of my family, to Beirut, to welcome my brother Dr. As'ad, returning from his post in Rome, where he had served as a counselor at the embassy. It had been decided to promote him to the rank of minister plenipotentiary, and to transfer him to the central administration in Damascus.

As we approached Sofar, with me driving our car, its brakes failed just as we were on the edge of the Hammana valley, and the car slid toward the ravine. But God delivered us from falling into the abyss, thanks to the car striking a large post, which brought it to a stop.

We arrived safely in Beirut, spent the day there, and returned to Damascus in the evening. While we were on our way back, we heard over the car radio the names of the new list of ministers, headed by President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Given the importance of the event, I record here the names of the members of that government.

The President chose four vice presidents for himself, two Egyptian and two Syrian.

The two Egyptians were Abdel Latif Boghdadi and Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer.

The two Syrians were Akram al-Hourani and Sabri al-Asali.

As for the ministers, they were:

Zakaria Mohieddin, Minister of Interior (Egyptian)

Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj, Minister of Interior for Syria (Syrian)

Hussein El-Shafei, Minister of Planning (Egyptian)

Hassan Jabara, Minister of Planning (Syrian)

Mustafa Hamdoun, Minister of Social Affairs (Syrian)

Kamal El-Din Hussein, Minister of Education (Egyptian)

Dr. Nureddin Tarraf, Minister of Health (Egyptian)

Dr. Shawkat al-Qanawati, Minister of Health (Syrian)

Ahmad Husni, Minister of Justice (Egyptian)

Dr. AbdulWahab Homad, Minister of Justice (Syrian)

Fathi Radwan, Minister of National Guidance (Egyptian)

Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Egyptian)

Salah al-Din al-Bitar, Minister of State (Syrian)

Ahmad Hasan al-Baquri, Minister of Religious Endowments (Egyptian)

Ahmad al-Sharabasi, Minister of Public Works (Egyptian)

Nureddin Kahhaleh, Minister of Public Works (Syrian)

Muhammad Abu Nusayr, Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs (Egyptian)

Ahmad Abdel Karim, Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs (Syrian)

Dr. Abdel Moneim El-Kaissouni, Minister of Economy and Trade (Egyptian)

Khalil Kallas, Minister of Economy and Trade (Syrian)

Dr. Kamal Ramzi Stino, Minister of Supply (Egyptian)

Sayed Marei, Minister of Agriculture (Egyptian)

Ahmad al-Hajj Younes, Minister of Agriculture (Syrian)

Fakhir al-Kayali, Minister of the Treasury (Syrian)

Dr. Hassan Abbas Zaki, Minister of the Treasury (Egyptian)

Ali Sabri, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs (Egyptian)

Dr. Aziz Sidqi, Minister of Industry (Egyptian)

Dr. Mustafa Khalil, Minister of Communications (Egyptian)

Amin al-Nafouri, Minister of Communications (Syrian)

Fathi Rizq, Deputy Minister of War

It is worth noting that, for any ministry with two ministers, each worked in his own country, with his authority limited to his own region, whereas the ministries assigned only a single minister had authority over the entire territory of the Republic, and were based in Cairo, such as Sheikh al-Baquri, Hassan Abbas Zaki, Mahmoud Fawzi, and Aziz Sidqi, all of them Egyptian, with the exception of Mr. Salah al-Din al-Bitar (the Syrian), who was appointed Minister of State with his seat in Cairo.

The post of Minister of State is given either to a great political figure, to strengthen the government by his presence, or to a lesser figure, in order to maintain a balance among the parties whose coalition forms the cabinet. In our earlier councils we used to say of the Ministry of State that it was a ministry with a salary and without any work.

Mr. al-Bitar, however, was a figure of real political weight, and he was honored with the Ministry of State.

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Endnotes:

[1] The following are the numbers of these checks, taken from Mohamed Hassanein Heikal's book "What Is Happening in Syria" (undated), p. 40: Check no. 85902, dated 20 February 1958, drawn on the Arab Bank in Riyadh for one million pounds sterling, in the name of Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj, and transferred to al-Sarraj's account at the Arab Bank in Damascus. Check no. 85903, for 700,000 pounds sterling, to Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj (same date). Check no. 85904, for 200,000 pounds sterling, to Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj (same date). It is through conspiracies such as these, and the ugly acts of a similar kind, that the oil wealth flowing from Arab (Islamic) soil is squandered. And people are left to ask why we were defeated in every war we fought, armed with corrupt weapons.