Year 1963 - Part 6: President al-Qudsi's Silence When Officers Demand He Name Homad Prime Minister

Saturday the 23rd

I had a long conversation today with Mr. Salah al-Bitar at his own home.

Mr. al-Bitar is troubled, since he is still "gathering the scattered pieces of his own torn party," which has now split into three:

His own "pure unionist" party, formed after he came to regret signing the secession's own petition and repented sincerely of the virus of secessionism, embracing instead a "carefully studied union." The faction still drowning in error alongside Akram al-Hourani. And the "Unionist Socialists" group, demanding the restoration of union exactly as it once was. Time would later reveal that some of these last men would go on to join the "coming current," merging into it entirely, forgetting both carefully studied union and full merger union alike.

Mr. Salah told me he had indeed declined Dr. al-Qudsi's own invitation to meet with him. He added that an officer, Brigadier General Adnan Aqil, had recently visited him, telling him a group of officers wished to establish a federation with Iraq, against the United Arab Republic. But Mr. al-Bitar dismissed the idea, telling his own visitor that the Iraqis would never even agree to discuss it, and that he himself had raised the possibility of a bilateral union with them, while in Baghdad, only for them to reject it, declaring their own firm rejection of any policy of Arab "axes."

Mr. Salah said the Syrian situation had fallen into a predicament with no clear way out, one he himself was searching for an exit from, without yet finding any safe path toward it.

He cited, in support of this, the two speeches the army commander had delivered, in which he proposed union or federation with Iraq, only for not a single Iraqi to bother answering him.

He said he had learned that the Syrian army command had undergone sweeping changes, removing from it "the hardened Damascene secessionists," and would soon announce its own new direction.

Sunday the 24th of February, the first day of the blessed Eid al-Fitr

At Mr. al-Fatih's own house, I met his relative, Colonel Abdullah al-Sheikh Attiya.

He was known as "the honorable officer," for having exposed a conspiracy Adib al-Shishakli had been preparing for his own return, after being driven out of Syria in the 1950s.

Colonel Abdullah had served as military attaché in Baghdad, and had recently been transferred to Ankara.

He had visited the northern Kurdish region, and was alarmed by what he heard there. He told us he had sent a report to his own superiors, affirming that he had learned that Mr. Rashad Barmada (himself of Kurdish origin) was in contact with Iraqi Kurds, and served as their own representative in Syria.

The Colonel added that he had attached a set of documents to his own report, and assured us he would keep pressing this matter at the very highest levels.

In fairness, I do not find this claim free of recklessness and rashness at all, for Rashad was a classmate of mine in secondary school, and I later spent many long years alongside him in political work, our own relations always among the warmest of friendships. Not once, in all that time, did I ever sense in him the slightest inclination toward establishing a Kurdish state or any similar entity.

I pressed the Colonel on the objectivity of his own report, but he remained firm in his own view, saying: his own speeches and statements are right there in your own hands, dripping with rancor toward Abdel Nasser, simply because he leads the effort to establish the great Arab state.

Mr. Ali Bouzo had himself once been accused of this very same unjust charge, meant only to damage his own reputation, and it remained nothing but an accusation, unsupported by a shred of real evidence.

How unjust are accusations born of rumor, seized upon by buried grudges, tarnishing the reputation of innocent men merely to take revenge on blameless victims and blacken their own spotless record.

From Abdel Samad's house, we made our way to Nihad al-Qasim's own house, to discuss the general situation. "Abu Umar," al-Qasim, told us that secret contacts had been made with him, amounting to nothing more than the same coup talk that had by now become common currency on the political market.

The three of us settled on the view that the situation had become unbearable, even by the smallest push, and that it was, in effect, already fallen, teetering between life and death.

But we would never take part in a massacre, one whose victims would be Nazim al-Qudsi, Khaled al-Azm, Rashad Barmada, and others besides, men the people themselves despise.

We concluded that the best solution would be to force the President of the Republic to suspend the constitution, declare martial law, and entrust the premiership to one of us, followed by an official statement explaining the new direction to the people, telling them plainly that the new government sought to establish a federal union with Egypt, not a full merger union, one that had never been free of flaws. One of us asked: and what if al-Qudsi refuses this proposal?

The answer came that al-Qudsi would never accept any solution coming through us, the one truly safe path, unless persuaded through some real, credible threat.

We decided to gather our own public and secret leadership, ten people in all, once the Eid holidays had ended, to decide on whatever steps seemed appropriate.

But the atmosphere grew charged again that evening, for Cairo's Voice of the Arabs radio announced that the Egyptian authorities held important documents about the Rutba conference, the very conference once held between President al-Qudsi and Leader Abdel Karim Qasim, whose own circumstances and contents had never been known. But once Abdel Karim Qasim was overthrown and the unionists seized power in Iraq, these secret documents fell into their own hands. It is certain they sent copies of them to President Abdel Nasser, and Voice of the Arabs promised to broadcast these documents at the appropriate time. It also quoted an official, at the very end of its news bulletin, stressing the necessity of never bargaining with the secessionists over any form of "half-measures" whatsoever.

Monday the 25th: A Shift in al-Qudsi's Direction

The Iraqi tribal leader Ajil al-Yawar had taken refuge in Syria during Abdel Karim Qasim's own rule in Iraq. Once the secession took place in Syria, he grew resentful of the secessionists and left Syria for Germany. He now passed through Damascus, on his own way back to his own country.

Abdel Samad al-Fatih met with him, and al-Ajil told him the following:

He said he had visited the President of the Syrian Republic that very evening.

The President asked him: as you make your way back to Iraq, how do you think we should act to improve our own relations with the Iraqi leaders?

Al-Ajil answered him: I do not believe any real progress can be achieved with these new progressive revolutionaries, so long as you remain surrounded by these repugnant faces among your own ministers and aides.

Al-Qudsi said: and what would you have me do, bound as I am by the text of the constitution, which obliges me to summon the chamber of deputies, should the ailing Prime Minister, Khaled al-Azm, resign?

Al-Ajil said: I am an Iraqi, and it is not my place to interfere in your own constitution. But what I would like to know, so that I may convey it to Iraq's own leaders, is whether you are prepared to change the repugnant faces surrounding you.

Al-Qudsi answered, in a tone of firm resolve: "Yes, I am ready. Tell your own brothers that. I am prepared to change every one of my own ministers."

We asked ourselves: and what could he possibly do, holding nothing of real power in his own hands beyond the chewing of words, and amusing himself with delusions?

Despite this conviction, we thought it wise to watch this new atmosphere closely.

Abdel Samad told Ahmad al-Ajil: should Iraq's new leaders simply close the Syrian-Iraqi border for two months, the Syrian regime would collapse without a single shot being fired. Al-Ajil promised to convince Abdel Salam Aref of this very wish.

It is certain that, were the President genuinely sincere in this new direction, and truly capable of carrying it out, he would have solved the whole problem of the secession himself, securing his own place in contemporary political history, even if only in the sense of "a brother forced into heroism, not a hero by choice."

But how could he hope to achieve these "new wishes" of his, when he could resist the resentful officers only by relying on loyal ones in turn? This is exactly the source of the fire now threatening to consume everything, green and dry alike.

In this stagnant swamp, a captain needs both boldness and resolve. President al-Qudsi, though, is an exceedingly peaceable man, especially now that he realizes he no longer holds any real power over anything at all.

Lieutenant General Zahreddine writes, in his own memoirs, that he received letters from "the Free Officers," some of them secessionists themselves, who had begun feeling real anxiety, and quotes one of them: "We have already made clear to you that we have no wish for division and bloodshed, except under duress. We hope you will decide (to allow al-Nahlawi and his officers to return), and not force us to resort to methods we would rather avoid... or else..."[1]

He also writes: "The military intelligence branch had become nearly paralyzed. It would often relay reversed information to me, dressing a friend in an enemy's clothing, and an enemy in a friend's, until I could no longer tell my own friend from my own enemy. What can be said of military intelligence applies equally to civilian intelligence, that is, the internal security command. The intelligence branch would come to me, for example, saying that Muwaffaq Assasa (a Damascene officer) was about to stage a coup, and that Haitham al-Mahayni (likewise) would bomb the command from the air. Then, the very next day, it would come and say that Ziad al-Hariri was about to launch a mutiny, that the armored brigade under Mahmoud Odeh's own command was about to launch a lightning attack on Damascus, and that Haydar al-Kuzbari was preparing a move of his own, in coordination with King Hussein."[2]

Such was the state of affairs within the ruling circles and the armed forces alike, anxious and confused, "unable to tell their own heads from their own feet."

Even so, until the Eid holidays came to an end, we decided to wait and see which way the compass of general events would ultimately point.

Friday, 1 March

Mr. Zuhdi al-Jasser, who used to co-edit the Aleppo newspaper Al-Nadhir alongside Mr. Ahmad Qanbar, and who became, during the union, director of the Aleppo Oil Company, visited me today, quite unexpectedly.

He is a man who makes no secret of his own secessionist sympathies, standing firmly with the era, and closely tied to both Mr. Ahmad Qanbar, the former Minister of Interior, and to President Nazim al-Qudsi.

Signs of real turmoil were plain on his own face, and in his own choice of words.

He said "the Nasserists" were carrying out a "natural act of terror" in Aleppo, and gave his own view that they were being paid by Abdel Nasser. He confessed real fear of the future.

He asked me: do you have any solution to the crisis of governance?

I asked him in turn: is the government even in a crisis?

He gave a bitter, forced laugh, and said: do you believe the latest reshuffling of officers, carried out by the military command, can serve as the starting point for any political solution?

I told him: frankly, no, I do not believe so at all, since they are all cut from the very same cloth.

He asked: and what way out do you see, from this crisis threatening every possible outcome?

I told him: I do have a solution, though I imagine you will find it rather surprising, coming from me. He asked eagerly what this solution was. I told him: inform Dr. al-Qudsi that if he can persuade Rushdi al-Kikhya to form a new ministry, one including none of the current ministers, we will accept it. Should he prefer we take no part in the government ourselves, we will demand nothing at all, and will continue to support him regardless.

We will accept no Prime Minister other than him. But we set three general conditions:

1. That al-Kikhya pledge to work toward establishing a tripartite union between Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. Should this prove impossible, we would settle, if necessary, for a bilateral union between Syria and Egypt alone.

2. No cooperation whatsoever with the men of the secessionist era who have compromised themselves, men well known for it, and the removal of the monopolistic capitalists' own influence from the institutions of government.

3. A moderate socialist direction. And so that economic matters not stand in the way of political progress, we accept a pledge to preserve the general income tax law, a law applied even in the most reactionary and economically liberal capitalist countries.

I reminded him of Abdel Nasser's own words, in his most recent speech, that "socialism comes in the following stage."

He asked me: could Abdel Nasser be persuaded to extend an invitation to Rushdi al-Kikhya to visit Cairo?

I asked him in turn: if Rushdi does not hold the reins of government, in what capacity would Abdel Nasser even invite him?

Al-Jasser expressed real regret over Nazim al-Qudsi, comparing him to a mouse trying to save itself from a ship sinking amid raging waves.

He promised to return and visit me tomorrow, hoping to bring back some reassuring answer, and it seemed certain he would relay our own conversation straight back to President al-Qudsi.

Saturday, 2 March

Colonel Said informed us, through his own relative and our friend Dr. Abidin Hammadeh, that thirty officers had met with the President of the Republic, at their own request, and spoke to him with the utmost candor, telling him that the general situation had deteriorated to a point no reasonable man could tolerate any longer, nor predict the consequences of. They said they could no longer accept this state of affairs, one that could well become the spark igniting a devastating conflagration.

The President asked them: and what do you propose I do to fix the general situation? Their own spokesman answered: we want to be rid of this government, and of most of its own ministers, branded as they are with treacherous secessionism. They named the Prime Minister and some of his own ministers to him directly.

The President told them: I will not debate with you whether the situation is good or bad. I know full well the country is uneasy, and that conspiracies are being woven against the regime in the dark, from many different sources and in many different directions. But I would like to tell you plainly and clearly that I ask you to agree among yourselves on a Prime Minister you can accept, and I will task him with forming the ministry, even if it were Ben-Gurion himself.

They answered him that the majority of the country wanted Dr. AbdulWahab Homad to form the government, though some among them nominated Mr. Salah al-Bitar for the task instead. It would be best, they said, for a quick response, since the newly appointed officers would be taking up their own new principal posts within less than ten days, and it would be best for the general situation to have already settled into a state acceptable to both the people and the army by then.

The President fell silent when he heard my own name. He lowered his head for a long while, and said nothing at all. Ever since we founded the People's Party together, he has shown me nothing more than the barest courtesy. My own political views may not sit well with him, nor my own social views either. We come from different roots, each of us holding fast to his own convictions. Within the People's Party, he represented its own right wing, I its own left wing. Neither of us was ever unaware of the other's own thinking, nor of his own political and economic convictions.

Not once, though we were both founders of the People's Party and fought several electoral battles together, on a single shared list, did he ever once choose me as a minister, in any of the several times he formed a government in the People's Party's own name.

Which is why I very much doubt he would ever agree to task me with forming the government, so long as he retains any power to oppose it.

For he knows I am a "Nasserist," and a "socialist" besides.

I do not know whether he still recalls Abu Firas al-Hamdani's own verse, in which he says:

My companions told me: flee, or face death.

I told them: these are but two bitter fates, and I know not which is the more bitter.

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Endnotes:

[1] P. 383.

[2] P. 344.