Year 1963 - Part 5: A Secret Coup Proposal Offering the Author the Premiership Through Ziad al-Hariri's Emissary

Sunday the 17th: A Messenger from the Army Commander

Lieutenant General Zahreddine sent a secret messenger to our brother Ratib al-Husami, to convey important news to us. General Abdel Karim and Ratib met at the former's own house, and sat together for a long session, lasting well into the late hours of the night.

Ratib told us the following:

1. The army commander had submitted a list of demands, in the army's own name, to Dr. Nazim al-Qudsi, calling for the country to be set back on the "sound" unionist path. He told him the army was determined to see it carried out.

2. This commander told Ratib that he knew eighty percent of the army's officers were unionists, and that he had decided to work toward fulfilling their own genuine wishes, and the people's own firm wish, for union.

3. He asked us, "the Nasserists," to let reason prevail and consider the homeland's own interest, refraining from pursuing military coups, since the country would otherwise drown in blood, and terrifying massacres and purges would follow. He added that he would remain in contact with us, to search for a way out of the crisis other than a military coup, since any regime arising in the wake of a coup would need international recognition, and would bring troubles and ambitions with no clear end in sight.

4. The Lieutenant General used unflattering language regarding both Khaled al-Azm and Akram al-Hourani, saying the day of their own reckoning was bound to come soon.

5. He insisted that any future union be a union of two peoples, not a surrender.

Ratib assured him that we were "unionists, unionists alone." The word "Nasserism" was never a cult of personality, but simply a label our own opponents had chosen for us. Even so, we did support Abdel Nasser's own leadership, since we trusted him, his own integrity, his own clean hands, and his own sincerity, and we spoke of him from real knowledge and confidence.

As the greatest contemporary Arab leader, the one the nation places all its own hopes in.

Zahreddine speaks, in his own memoirs, of a unionist plan he drew up and circulated among "his officers" for discussion, its own goal being "to redirect the country back onto the socialist unionist path.

Informing the President of the Republic of the decision the Defense Council would take, then proceeding to implement it without hesitation" (p. 400).

The Lieutenant General adds (p. 402) that the officers' committee split, as usual, into two camps:

A unionist, progressive camp, which approved the plan in full.

And a second camp, led by General Namiq Kamal, who called for patience, saying he had another plan of his own, which he summarized verbally by saying: I believe it necessary to work toward union in successive stages, that is, pursuing economic union first, then cultural union, then financial union, then military union, and so on.

It was decided the plan would be reconsidered on 9 March (p. 402).

Yet the era was toppled on 8 March instead, unmourned by anyone.

What draws attention is that the officers only wanted to inform Dr. al-Qudsi, merely inform him, not seek his own opinion, nor have any decision taken in his own presence, out of some regard for his own dignity.

For the sake of historical accuracy, we were not entirely at ease with what Zahreddine had told us, sensing that he wanted us to understand he was working for union, so that we might one day stand as witnesses to his own unionist credentials, all while maneuvering between the unionists and the secessionists at the very same time.

Even so, undeniable proof now lay within our own reach that Dr. al-Qudsi's own era was breathing its last, and that its own pillars would soon scatter like autumn leaves on a stormy day.

Mr. Salah al-Bitar told us today that the President of the Republic had summoned him for a meeting, as he had summoned Michel Aflaq as well, hoping perhaps to learn from them what they had found in Iraq, but both refused to answer his own summons. His own messenger, the palace's Secretary-General Mr. Riyad al-Maidani, returned dragging the tail of disappointment behind him.

Poor President! Had he only listened to Rushdi al-Kikhya's own advice not to accept this deceptive presidency in the first place, he would have spared himself these rather undignified "shocks."

Monday the 18th: A Messenger from Abdel Nasser

The well-known politician and head of the Arab Bar Association, Mr. Shafiq Arshidat, a unionist figure and a prominent opponent of King Hussein's own rule, arrived from Cairo. He asked to meet with us, and after some general pleasantries, told us he was carrying a message from Abdel Nasser, entrusted to him personally.

Here is its substance:

a. President Abdel Nasser is no longer content with the restoration of a full merger union exactly as it once was.

b. What matters to him now is the establishment of a national government embracing unionist directions, one that removes from the scene those elements hostile to union.

c. It has become preferable, for the sake of unionist work, that we explicitly commit ourselves to preserving the current regional political entities. This means returning to establishing federations, not full unions.

d. Both West and East will together resist the establishment of any union, but neither will resist liberation revolutions.

e. Socialism can wait, and there is no objection to it coming in a second stage.

It is certain that point (c) removes the regionalists' own fears, and brings us back to the federation decided upon in 1958, before it turned, for no reasonable cause, into a full merger union. We had supported it then, not out of any hatred of it as a national principle, but because we considered it premature, coming after a separation between the two regions that had lasted centuries.

Tuesday the 19th: A Secret Meeting with a Messenger from Colonel Ziad al-Hariri

Today is the twenty-fifth of the month of Ramadan.

In this holy month, the devils themselves are chained, and both foul speech and bodily harm are forbidden.

Yet, as in every month before it, the sanctity of the fast has never once shielded us from the secessionists' own obscenities and harm.

We read the words of the Almighty: "And we will surely be patient against whatever harm you may cause us. And upon God let those who trust rely." (Surat Ibrahim, verse 12)

Just as we were sitting down for the iftar meal, my friend Mr. Darwish al-Alwani contacted me, insisting I join him for dinner at his own table.

I found this last-minute invitation rather strange.

Darwish was a fellow student of ours in France, though he chose to specialize in geography at the University of Grenoble. I visited him in his own hometown, just as he visited me many times in Paris.

After our own return, our ties remained excellent, and I hold him in special regard for his own steadfast devotion to the unionist creed, one he never once strayed from.

When Akram al-Hourani raised the banner of secession, Darwish, once one of his own party members, broke with him, and walked with us instead, along this same pure and honorable path.

Which is why, when he pressed me so insistently to accept his invitation, I sensed he had something to tell me in the presence of a third party.

My own instinct proved correct, for he had a civilian guest with him I had never met before.

He introduced him to me as his own brother-in-law, his own sister's husband, naming him Captain Aref al-Jaja. The three of us had dinner together, then moved to a side room.

The Captain took the floor, speaking with a confidence and composure one could only envy.

He said he served as Chief of Staff of the brigade commanded by Colonel Ziad al-Hariri on the Syrian front facing Israel, and that a number of unionist officers, he repeated this term deliberately, had formed a military committee among themselves, fully prepared to overturn the criminal secessionist regime, his own words again.

Preparations, he said, were now complete. The zero hour for action had not yet been set, but it was near.

"Ziad," he said, had decided to strike the blow he had long been preparing for, and the hour of reckoning with these treacherous scoundrels had finally come.

He had sent me to you on a secret mission: he wants your own agreement to form the government. We ourselves want nothing but the Ministry of Defense. Every other ministry, you may choose as you see fit. The Colonel does, however, recommend Dr. Abdel Halim Suwaidan highly.

I hope to convey your agreement back to him, so that the statement can be broadcast the moment the coup operation succeeds. As for the next steps, he said:

Once the government is formed, negotiations will begin with President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and with Iraq, toward establishing a tripartite union, one you would agree upon together in both form and substance.

The agreement would then be put to a popular referendum in all three regions, to secure its own popular legitimacy.

I listened, scarcely able to believe what I was hearing, for this was the first time coup-makers had ever approached me with a coup conspiracy before its own execution. I confess the surprise left me stunned.

But faced with so grave a proposal, I had to answer it. It was certain that the responsibility resting on a successful coup would be immense, and greater still should the coup-makers' own movement fail. I gathered my own composure, and told him:

1. My own view is that Syria has already bled far too much, and its own reputation has sunk to the depths, given the sheer number of its own coups.

If you truly command overwhelming strength, why not simply pressure Dr. al-Qudsi, even through threats if need be, to form a government headed by a unionist, one that would work toward a negotiated union without any need for a coup at all, since a coup will require international recognition, and may bring consequences impossible to foresee, being, in any case, a gamble. It might be possible to persuade him to send the ailing Khaled al-Azm to a hospital in Czechoslovakia for treatment, entrust the vice presidency to a known unionist, remove the secessionist ministers, and then approach Abdel Nasser to negotiate union.

2. I said: should a single drop of blood be shed from any one of my own "former" brothers, and he understood from these words that I meant Nazim al-Qudsi and some of his own ministers, then I would consider myself free of any tie to you whatsoever.

3. The "four Nasserists" (Nihad al-Qasim, Ali Bouzo, Abdel Samad al-Fatih, and Ratib al-Husami) must play the leading role in steering the ship of government, until the coming union is finally secured, since their own presence in power stands as the guarantee of the unionist direction.

4. It might be preferable not to form a government at all, contenting ourselves instead with the coup leader's own presidency, or that of whoever he chooses as head of a body of secretaries-general (deputy ministers) for a transitional period, until matters settle, at which point a provisional government would be formed, its own task overseeing general elections, or moving toward negotiating a tripartite union with Egypt (and perhaps Iraq). The Captain spoke up, raising a number of objections, saying they had already perfected their own plan, and that their coup was certain to succeed, but that no margin for failure could be allowed. They were therefore looking for an arrangement that, if established the moment the coup succeeded, would reassure the people and form a complete, cohesive structure from the outset.

At that point, I proposed that they offer the premiership to Rushdi al-Kikhya, who had withdrawn from politics, and press him hard to accept the task, framing it as an act of national rescue. Rushdi is well known for his own unionist convictions, having refused to sign the secession's own petition, and having twice refused the presidency of the republic himself, out of his own distrust of the military. His presence at the head of government would reassure us all, and bring real calm to a wide segment of right-leaning citizens, who consider him one of their own. He is, of course, nothing of the sort, for he belongs to us. With him at the helm, the path toward union would become acceptable to every social and political segment of the country.

We agreed that he would relay what he had heard from me back to "his own group."

Mr. Darwish later told me they were not particularly pleased with my own answer.

Especially with my own nomination of Mr. Rushdi al-Kikhya, whom they consider a reactionary.

But I meant exactly what I said. Caution, in swamps such as these, is an absolute duty.

In the depths of my own soul, I also knew that the current state of affairs could only be swept away by a military coup, yet in that same depth, I recoiled from coups themselves, for they humiliate the people, kill off political life, tear apart the ranks of the army, and pull it away from its own true mission. Which is why al-Hariri's own proposal to me found no welcome echo in me at all. I recall that the officers of the powerful Fifth Brigade in Homs, unionists themselves, led by Lieutenant General Muhammad al-Sufi, were preparing yet another coup of their own. And who knows, perhaps a third group of officers was organizing a third coup as well.

Thursday the 21st

Several newspapers published the text of the telegram we had sent to Abdel Salam Aref. I noticed the Iraqi President paid the Syrian officials no such attention as he had shown us, refusing to answer the telegrams of certain Syrian officials. Among those he declined to answer, I noted, was Foreign Minister As'ad Mahassen, one of "the heroes of Chtaura."

On the local front, several republican decrees were issued, accepting the resignation of certain ministers and entrusting their own ministries, in an acting capacity, to ministers who had not resigned.

Decree No. 16251, dated /2/1963, accepted the resignation of Messrs. Rashad Barmada, Khalil al-Kallas, Abdel Halim Qaddour, Amin al-Nafouri, Nabil al-Tawil, and Omar Odeh al-Khatib.

By further decrees issued the same date, the Ministry of Health was entrusted to Dr. Farhan al-Jundali, Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs, the Ministry of Labor to Mr. George Khoury, Minister of Industry, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the engineer Subhi Kahhale, Minister of Transport, the Ministry of Education, in an acting capacity, to Interior Minister General Aziz Abdel Karim, the Ministry of Finance, in an acting capacity, to Dr. Izzat Trabulsi, Minister of Economy, and the Ministry of Supply, in an acting capacity, to Agriculture Minister Mr. Mazhar al-Azma.

The Muslim Brotherhood's own response to their own ministers' resignations (call them dismissals, rather) was not long in coming, for Mr. Ali al-Tantawi, father-in-law of Mr. Issam al-Attar and well known for his own sharp tongue, attacked the government in his own Friday sermon as well. It was said the commander of the internal security forces summoned the two of them and issued a stern warning to both.

And so the government lost its own strongest elements, and its own condition grew ever more unstable.

Those who remained might fairly be described as mere technocrats, men with no political color of their own to speak of, even as most of them came to hold two ministries at once, or more.

Friday the 22nd: Union Day

Had the union still been "alive," today would have marked its fifth birthday. But it was crushed in the very bloom of its youth.

In the darkness of this morning, the radio stations carried news of a delegation from Iraq's new era traveling to Cairo, to take part in Egypt and Syria's own "Union Day" celebrations.

At the head of the delegation stood Ali Salih al-Sa'di, Deputy Prime Minister.

Al-Sa'di delivered a speech we listened to, among the harshest ever directed at the secessionists and their own paid press. He warned them their own end was near, and called for boundless cooperation with Cairo on every level.

President Abdel Nasser delivered a magnificent speech, reminding the Arab world of the national victories achieved in Yemen, Algeria, and Baghdad, without mentioning Cairo's own considerable role in achieving these very victories.

We received readings, as it were, of the temperature gauges of the ruling circle in Damascus. Their own fever, we were told, had risen well above forty degrees, their own blood pressure nearing the red line.

There is no doubt that some people possess a truly astonishing sense of smell, able to sniff out with their own noses whatever tomorrow may bring.

And a friend of mine was one of them. Whenever he happened to run into me, he made a point of insulting President Abdel Nasser, his own intelligence service, and his own failure to finish off Israel.

The scent of the tottering era's own collapse reached his own nostrils, and he grew fearful of what tomorrow might bring, telling himself: now, now, not tomorrow.

I ran into him in the street, and, well, brace yourself for the sudden change of heart. My "friend" had transformed, from a bitter enemy of union and its own founder, into a "unionist," bringing me the glad tidings that "the dish is finally cooked," and that "the secession's own end is now within a stone's throw."

I recalled what a sage, just as fickle as he was, once told me: "Our own philosophy, the very creed we suckled on, is that we are children of today alone, never asking what we were yesterday, nor what we shall be tomorrow." By this he meant to proclaim, in the ugliest terms opportunism ever taught its own disciples, the art of adapting swiftly to events the very moment they occur.

"A red face, but no lump caught in the throat."

"A thousand somersaults, but never a real defeat."

"Whoever marries my mother, I'll call him uncle."

"The hand you cannot bite, kiss it instead, and pray it breaks."